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Justice	 Amy	 Coney	 Barrett	 to	 the	 Supreme	 Court.	 	Much	was	made	 of	
Justice	 Barrett’s	 judicial	 philosophy	 during	 her	 confirmation	 hearings,	
with	many	critics	focusing	on	her	commitment	to	an	originalist	reading	of	
the	 Constitution,	 as	 well	 as	 her	 treatment	 of	 precedent.	 	 Ramos	 v.	
Louisiana	 was	 the	 only	 case	 that	 directly	 overturned	 constitutional	
precedent	during	the	Court’s	previous	term.	 	In	light	of	this	holding,	her	
judicial	views,	especially	her	belief	that	originalism	does	not	conflict	with	
stare	 decisis	 because	 the	 former	 requires	 a	 judge	 to	 adhere	 to	 the	
“ultimate	precedent”	 in	the	Constitution,	might	put	the	already	tenuous	




Apodaca	 v.	 Oregon.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 the	majority	 opinion	 invited	 several	
concurring	 opinions	 that	 disagreed	with	 the	 treatment	 of	 Apodaca	 by	
certain	 Justices	 comprising	 the	 majority,	 and	 one	 acerbic	 dissenting	
opinion.	 	To	 assess	how	 Justice	Barrett	might	 fare	 in	 the	Court’s	 post‐
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Consider the following: A jury in a Louisiana state court votes 10-2 
to convict a man of murder.  The individual appeals his conviction on the 
basis that Louisiana’s law permitting nonunanimous juries to hand out 
felony convictions violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  The case eventually reaches the Supreme Court, and the 
nine Justices find themselves facing one of two possible choices.  First, 
they can vote to overturn the conviction by striking down Louisiana’s 
law as unconstitutional.  To do so, they would have to confront a prior 
decision that acknowledged the validity of such laws, but conveniently 
there is ample evidence to support the view that the Sixth Amendment 
requires unanimous juries for felony convictions, proving the Court’s 
prior decision was an anomaly.  Alternatively, the Justices could resign 
the man to his fate with little effort or justification by simply invoking 
the doctrine of stare decisis.  
This was the precise situation the Court faced in the 2020 case of 
Ramos	v.	Louisiana.1  Logic suggests that the Court’s Justices would have 
voted along their ideological lines.  A popular narrative, after all, is that 
“all Democrat-appointed Justices are reliably liberal and all Republican-
appointed Justices are reliably conservative.”2  Yet, the actual holding of 
Ramos was unusual to say the least; the Justices put forth sharply 
conflicting understandings of the principle of stare decisis in a 6-3 
decision, which consisted of several vigorous concurring opinions and 
one dissenting opinion.3  
The murkiness surrounding the principle of stare decisis and its 
application was thus made evident in Ramos.  The end result was that a 
 
 1 Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1393-1395 (2020). 
 2 Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How	To	Save	the	Supreme	Court, 129 YALE L.J. 
148, 156 (2019).  
 3 As summarized in Ramos’s syllabus, only the late Justice Ginsburg and Justice 
Breyer joined all parts of Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion, with Justice Sotomayor and 
Justice Kavanaugh joining different parts of the majority opinion and Justice Thomas 
only agreeing with the judgment.  The three concurring Justices filed separate opinions, 
whereas Justice Alito, joined by Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan, issued a dissenting 
opinion.  Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1392. 
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remarkably fractured Supreme Court struck down Louisiana’s law at 
issue, decided that the scope of the Sixth Amendment guaranteed the 
constitutional right to a unanimous jury to be convicted for serious 
crimes in state courts, and incorporated the provision through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4   In doing so, the six 
Justices who agreed on the outcome had the aforementioned choice of 
directly overturning the Court’s prior holding in Apodaca	 v.	Oregon.5  
But even those six Justices failed to reach an agreement in a rather 
spectacular fashion, with Justice Gorsuch along with two other Justices 
refusing to acknowledge Apodaca’s validity.  At the other end, led by 
Justice Alito, the three dissenting Justices vehemently defended 
Apodaca	 on the basis of stare decisis, emphasizing the necessity to 
uphold what they deemed to be applicable precedent.6  
Put this way, the result of Ramos	may seem somewhat reasonable.  
As this Article explains, however, Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning in Ramos	
might pose significant risks to the doctrine of stare decisis when 
exercised by the Court later down the road.  And any cracks in the logical 
basis behind stare decisis created by Ramos could very well worsen in 
the future thanks to Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s confirmation to the 
Court.  This is because of her unique—and perhaps troubling—view that 
there exists a pragmatic harmony between originalism and stare 
decisis—the former requires judges to abide by the ultimate precedent: 
the originalist interpretation of the Constitution.  This Article 
accordingly argues that given the ideological disagreements between 
the current Justices of the Court, stare decisis will be a woefully 
inadequate shield for defending the Court’s previous jurisprudence 
moving forward.  Then, based on Justice Barrett’s previous writings and 
opinions, this Article concludes by predicting how Justice Barrett might 
have voted in Ramos.  
 
II. Understanding	Ramos	
A. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND APODACA: A PRELUDE TO RAMOS 
To properly understand	 Ramos, we must head to the very 
beginning by turning to the text of the Sixth Amendment of the Bill of 
Rights, which states:  
 
	 4	 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397 (concluding that “if the Sixth Amendment’s right to a 
jury trial requires a unanimous verdict to support a conviction in federal court, it 
requires no less in state court.”). 
	 5	 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).  
	 6	 Ramos,	140 S. Ct. at 1425-26 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
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In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.7  
 
As is the case with most debates and disagreements in the realm of 
constitutional law, nearly each word of the Sixth Amendment is subject 
to some level of ambiguity and disagreement.  With the slightest stretch 
of imagination and minimal creativity, any two lawyers are capable of 
engaging in grueling debates regarding the respective meaning of the 
eighty-one words comprising the Sixth Amendment, which has, in fact, 
been thoroughly argued in the courts. 8   With respect to Ramos the 
particular word at issue was the term “impartial.”9  Indeed, what does it 
mean for a jury to be impartial?  Because the text of the Sixth 
Amendment does not offer much, if any, guidance on this issue, the role 
of the jury as practiced in common law might provide much-needed 
assistance in deciphering what the term was intended to mean.10  
The common law understanding of the term “impartial” appears to 
have incorporated a number of different meanings, one of which was the 
firm requirement of juror unanimity for a defendant to be criminally 
convicted in court.11  Those meanings, however, were not all included in 
the Sixth Amendment, and through the doctrine of selective 
incorporation, the Court incorporated most, but not all, of the 
protections within the Bill of Rights through the Due Process Clause of 
 
 7 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 8 Other than the right to trial by an impartial jury, the persisting legal issues 
surrounding the Sixth Amendment include the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, compulsory process to obtain defense witnesses, and assistance of counsel.  
BURT NEUBORNE, An	Overview	of	the	Bill	of	Rights, in FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN LAW 83, 
109 (Alan B. Morrison ed., 1996).  
	 9	 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1395 (stating that “[t]he text and structure of the Constitution 
clearly suggest that the term ‘trial by an impartial jury’ carried with it some	meaning 
about the content and requirements of a jury trial.”). 
 10 Joan L. Larsen, Ancient	Juries	and	Modern	Judges:	Originalism’s	Uneasy	Relationship	
with	 the	 Jury, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 959, 990 (2010) (explaining that the text of the Sixth 
Amendment “does not on its face help us decide what a jury is, or what it means to be 
tried by one.”).  
	 11	 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407-08 (finding “the requirement of unanimity arose during 
the Middle Ages and had become an accepted feature of the common-law jury by the 
18th century.”). 
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the Fourteenth Amendment.12  This practice was adopted as opposed to 
total incorporation. 13   It logically follows that parts of the original 
meaning were dropped along the way, as the common law 
understanding of an impartial jury traveled to state courts.  
Nevertheless, state courts’ actual practices regarding the jury 
system for felony trials before and after the ratification of the Sixth 
Amendment, including the requirement for unanimity, seem to have 
been fairly consistent throughout early American legal history.  The 
established facts indicate that the jury system referred to “twelve lay 
persons, who reached their verdict unanimously, and passed upon both 
fact and the law.”14  Sadly, heightened racial tensions, especially during 
and following the Reconstruction period, disrupted the common law 
understanding of a jury trial.15  As black jurors appeared in courtrooms, 
attacks on them followed, centered on accusations that they were likely 
to be more lenient toward defendants than white jurors.16  In the long 
run this chain reaction gave birth to Louisiana and Oregon’s problematic 
laws that permitted felony convictions by nonunanimous juries.17  In 
retrospect, the historical background of nonunanimous jury provisions 
leaves little doubt that they were passed for racist reasons 
notwithstanding their facially and purportedly race-neutral language.18 
Then came Apodaca and its sister case Johnson	v.	Louisiana.19  At 
issue in Apodaca	was whether the Sixth Amendment permitted felony 
convictions by nonunanimous juries in state courts. 20   Since both 
Louisiana and Oregon had legislation that did not mandate jury 
unanimity to render felony convictions in place, the Court was asked to 
address the constitutionality of such laws that enabled nonunanimous 
verdicts to stand.21  
 
 12 Aliza B. Kaplan & Amy Saack, Overturning	 Apodaca	 v.	Oregon	 Should	 be	 Easy:	
Nonunanimous	 Jury	Verdicts	 in	Criminal	Cases	Undermine	 the	Credibility	of	Our	 Justice	
System, 95 OR. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2017).  
 13 Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Hector R. Lozada, A	Nomination	of	a	Supreme	Court	Justice:	
The	Incorporation	Doctrine	Revisited, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 365, 374-75 (2010).  
 14 Larsen, supra	note 10, at 998.  
 15 Thomas W. Frampton, The	 Jim	 Crow	 Jury, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1593, 1641 (2018) 
(“[R]acial prejudice has always infected American’s criminal jury system.”).  
	 16	 Id. at 1603. 
	 17	 Id. at 1612 (“The broader political context, however, helps demonstrate how the 
adoption of nonunanimous verdicts in particular was motivated by racial bias.”). 
	 18	 See	id. at 1612-14, 1616-20.  
 19 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 366 (1972).  
	 20	 See	generally	Apodaca, 406 U.S. 
	 21	 Id. at 411 (summarizing the petitioners’ claim as arguing that the Sixth 
Amendment requires “a unanimous jury verdict in order to give substance to the 
reasonable-doubt standard otherwise mandated by the Due Process Clause.”). 
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In	Apodaca, four Justices ultimately found juror unanimity to be 
required by and applicable to state courts through the Sixth 
Amendment, whereas four other Justices performed what was 
essentially a cost-benefit analysis to conclude that juror unanimity 
could not be imposed on state courts. 22   Stuck between those two 
irreconcilable views, Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. concluded that while the 
requirement of juror unanimity did form part of the Sixth Amendment, 
the notion had not been fully incorporated with respect to state courts, 
and Oregon’s law was therefore not inconsistent with the Due Process 
Clause. 23   As such, the Constitution did not preempt states from 
convicting felony crimes by nonunanimous juries.24  
In a civil or hybrid legal system, Apodaca might have mattered less 
than it did in the U.S. common law system.  Being an obvious outlier in 
the Court’s jurisprudence,25 perhaps Apodaca would not have carried 
any binding precedential force.26  But in a common law system such as 
the U.S., Apodaca	 allowed Louisiana and Oregon to retain their 
preexisting laws, and permitted other states to potentially follow suit.27  
At a minimum, the impact of this case was substantial in Louisiana and 
Oregon. 28   In the latter, for example, a significant number of felony 
 
	 22	 Id.	(explaining that a requirement of unanimous juries would cause an increase in 
the number of hung juries when nonunanimous juries can sufficiently protect a 
defendant’s rights).  
 23 Justice Powell’s concurring opinion was rendered as part of Johnson	v.	Louisiana.  
Johnson, 406 U.S. at 371, 375 (explaining that even though the Sixth Amendment 
requires unanimous juries for criminal convictions in federal courts, “there is no sound 
basis for interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to require blind adherence by the 
States to all details of the federal Sixth Amendment standards.”). 
	 24	 Id. 
 25 The Court called Apodaca	an exception, created by an unusual split between the 
Justices, to the general rule that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the states 
as a “watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights.”  
The Court added that “[o]nly a handful of the Bill of Rights protections remain 
unincorporated.”  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765, n.14 (2010).  
 26 Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Judicial	Precedents	in	Civil	law	Systems:	A	Dynamic	
Analysis, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 519, 524 (2006) (“Under jurisprudence	 constante	
doctrines a judge is not bound by a single decision in a single previous instance.  
Authoritative force stems from a consolidated trend of decisions on a certain point.  The 
practice of the courts becomes a source of law when it matures into a prevailing line of 
precedents.”). 
 27 There is a counterargument that the theoretical basis of common law does not 
recognize an individual case as a final rule of law.  Graham Hughes, Common	 Law	
Systems, in FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN LAW 9, 18 (Alan B. Morrison ed., 1996). 
 28 In both states, individuals were convicted by nonunanimous juries only to be 
eventually exonerated.  See	generally	Zoe Chevalier,	The	Prisoners	Who	Were	Convicted	
by	 Hung	 Juries, THE NATION (Oct. 8, 2020), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/society/louisiana-non-unanimous-juries/; Conrad 
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convictions were reached by nonunanimous jury verdicts until Ramos	
was rendered,29 and all of this was in spite of legitimate concerns and 
issues surrounding the conduct of nonunanimous juries. 30   For a 
decision that the Court subsequently referred to as “one exception to 
this general rule,”31 Apodaca	had far more than a tangential impact on 
individual constitutional rights. 
B. RAMOS V. LOUISIANA 
Given the confusion and chaos that was Apodaca, ironically, Ramos	
may very well be a worthy successor.  At the outset, the Court’s holding 
in	Ramos seems simple enough: six Justices voted—against the dissent 
of three of their colleagues—that the Constitution requires convictions 
by unanimous juries for serious crimes in state courts, effectively setting 
aside Apodaca	for good.32  But as this Article explains, Ramos	is anything 
but simple.  
In Ramos, the petitioner, Evangelisto Ramos, was convicted of 
second-degree murder by a 10-2 jury verdict in Louisiana and 
sentenced to life in prison.33  The petitioner appealed his conviction, 
first to the Fourth Circuit, and then to the Supreme Court, arguing that 
Louisiana’s law was problematic because it permitted convictions by a 
nonunanimous jury for a felony; this law, he argued, contravened his 
constitutional right to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment.34 
The Court found that the Sixth Amendment incorporated the common 
law practice of juror unanimity in the term “trial by impartial jury,” and 
 
Wilson, Exonerations	Raise	Questions	About	Oregon’s	Controversial	Jury	System, OREGON 
PUBLIC BROADCASTING (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.opb.org/news/article/oregon-non-
unanimous-juries-exonerations.   
 29 The specific percentage was in excess of forty percent.  Kaplan and Saack, supra	
note 12, at 19.  
 30 Kaplan and Saack, supra	note 12, at 33-34 (explaining that jurors are more likely 
to sympathize with similar defendants whereas nonunanimous juries are also more 
likely to be verdict-driven than unanimous juries).  There was also evidence indicating 
that nonunanimous juries eschewed accuracy and thoroughness of in favor of efficiency.  
Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty	Votes	in	Jury	Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1273 
(2000) (stating that “empirical research alerts us to the fact that majority rule 
discourages painstaking analyses of the evidence and steers jurors toward swift 
judgments that too often are erroneous or at least highly questionable.”). 
 31 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765, n.14 (2010). 
	 32	 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1390, 1397. 
 33 Evangelisto Ramos’s conviction was in June 2016.  Louisiana subsequently 
amended its state constitution in 2018 to eliminate felony convictions by a 
nonunanimous jury, but the amendment only applied to crimes committed on or after 
January 1, 2019.  Id. at 1419 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).   
 34 The Fourth Circuit judgment contains additional factual details surrounding the 
crime and trial of Evangelisto Ramos.  They have been omitted here in order to focus on 
the topic.  State	v.	Ramos, 231 So.3d 44, 46-50 (2017).  
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that this right applied to both federal and state courts through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby striking down 
Louisiana and Oregon’s laws.35  The path Justice Gorsuch took and his 
specific reasoning, however, may have laid the groundwork for an 
uncertain future for the principle of stare decisis as it is exercised by the 
Court.  
Noting that juror unanimity had long been required in both state 
and federal criminal cases,36 Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, 
pointed to Apodaca as an obvious outlier based on which Louisiana and 
Oregon’s laws had been allowed to stand.37  And Apodaca	logically had 
to mean either that “the Sixth Amendment allows nonunanimous 
verdicts, or the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial applies with 
less force to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment.”38  Peculiarly, 
Louisiana itself did not argue for Apodaca to apply as binding precedent, 
but instead asserted that juror unanimity had been intentionally carved 
out of the Sixth Amendment by way of a revision to its text,39 or was 
simply not important enough to be included in the first place.40  The 
majority rejected both arguments. 41   Eschewing any urge to subject 
unanimity to a functionalist analysis—akin to what one faction of the 
Apodaca	 court had done—the majority limited its reasoning to the 
acknowledgement that the Sixth Amendment unequivocally required 
unanimous verdicts for felony convictions.42 
 
	 35	 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397 (concluding that “[t]here can be no question either that 
the Sixth Amendment’s unanimity requirement applies to state and federal criminal 
trials equally.”). 
	 36	 Id. at 1396-97 (explaining that juror unanimity was universally accepted 
throughout American legal history and the Court had consistently confirmed it prior to 
Apodaca).  For a criticism of Justice Gorsuch’s analysis of the historical and universal 
acceptance of jury unanimity, see	generally	Nicholas M. Mosvick and Mitchell A. Mosvick, 
The	Heller‐ization	of	Originalism:	Ramos	v.	Louisiana	and	the	Problem	of	Frozen	Context, 
2020 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 309 (2020). 
	 37	 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1399 (noting that with respect to Apodaca, “no one has found 
a way to make sense of it.”). 
	 38	 Id. at 1398.  
 39 Specifically, Louisiana argued that explicit references to unanimous verdicts had 
been removed from James Madison’s original proposal by the Senate.  In response, the 
majority pointed to the removal possibly being due to language surplusage and 
implications regarding other removed terms as the basis for rejecting Louisiana’s view.  
Id. at 1400.  It should be noted that the Apodaca plurality found the explanation “that the 
deletion was intended to have some substantive effect” to be more convincing than the 
counterargument.  Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410. 	
	 40	 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1400-01. 
	 41	 Id.	at 1401-02. 
	 42	 Id. at 1402 (“[A]t the time of the Sixth Amendment’s adoption, the right to trial by 
jury included	a right to a unanimous verdict.”).  
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To address Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, the majority then 
addressed the elephant in the room: did Justice Powell’s concurring 
opinion in Apodaca	deserve the benefit of the doubt per the principle of 
stare decisis?43  Here, three of the Justices answered in the negative and 
subsequently rejected Justice Powell’s reasoning.44  Regarding how to 
approach a plurality opinion, Justice Gorsuch	parted with the dissent on 
how to read Marks	v.	United	States,45	which had held that where fewer 
than five Justices agree on a given case, the “position taken by those 
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds” 
shall be deemed to be the holding. 46   According to the dissent, 
irrespective of the fractured nature of the decision, the Marks	 rule 
awarded precedential force to Apodaca	even without the agreement of 
a majority of the Court.47  Justice Gorsuch, Justice Breyer, and Justice 
Ginsburg argued, in contrast, that Marks did not apply to Justice Powell’s 
opinion at all.48  This was because both the plaintiff and the defendant 
in this case agreed that Justice Powell’s opinion carried no precedential 
force since the basis for that opinion was the consistently rejected dual-
track rule of incorporation.49  As its secondary argument, the dissent 
argued for the precedential effect of Justice Powell’s opinion with 
respect to at least the result.50  But Justice Gorsuch was unwilling to 
validate the result of Justice Powell’s opinion without also taking its 
reasoning into account and dismissed this argument as well.51 
In the next section of Ramos the majority reasoned that even if 
Apodaca	 had precedential force, the Court would nevertheless be 
 
	 43	 Id.	at 1402 (casting doubt on the notion that “a single Justice writing only for 
himself has the authority to bind this Court to propositions it has already rejected.”). 
	 44	 Id.	 at 1430 (Alito, J., dissenting).  Only Justice Gorsuch, Justice Ginsburg, and 
Justice Breyer agreed on this part.  To the dissent, this was a baffling assertion, especially 
since the Court had denied certiorari to a number of similar cases following Apodaca.  Id. 
at 1429 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The idea that Apodaca	was a phantom precedent defies 
belief.”).  But, the Court had previously stated that “those denials have no precedential 
significance.”  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 868.  
 45 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).  
	 46	 Id.	at 193. 
	 47	 Ramos, 140 S. Ct.	at 1430 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“This rule ascribes precedential 
status to decisions made without majority agreement on the underlying rationale, and 
it is therefore squarely contrary to the argument of the three Justices who regard 
Apodaca	as non-precedential.”). 
 48 Justice Gorsuch declared that “Marks	has nothing to do with this case.”  Id.	at 1403. 
	 49	 Id.	(pointing out that “both sides admit that Justice Powell’s opinion cannot bind 
us”). 
	 50	 Id.	at 1404. 
	 51	 Id.	 at 1404 (dismissing Justice Alito’s argument for distinguishing between 
Apodaca’s result and reasoning because “stripped from any reasoning, its judgment 
alone cannot be read to repudiate this Court’s repeated pre-existing teachings on the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.”).  
LEE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2021  11:14 PM 
304 SETON	HALL	LEGISLATIVE	JOURNAL [Vol. 45:2 
compelled to overturn it, especially since the principle of stare decisis is 
at its weakest when deliberating questions of constitutional law. 52  
Consistent with the traditional framework for determining whether to 
overturn precedent, the Court considered the following factors: “the 
quality of the reasoning behind the decision at issue, consistency 
between it and related decisions, legal developments since the decision 
was rendered, and reliance on the decision.”53  Applying this framework, 
the Court’s analysis was rather straightforward.  Both the reasoning 
behind the Apodaca plurality opinion and Justice Powell’s opinion were 
poor because they were “gravely mistaken,” and Apodaca	 was 
inconsistent with case law prior and subsequent to its rendering, 
thereby allowing the majority to move on to the issue of reliance 
interests.54 
Here, in addition to vociferously disagreeing with the majority’s 
treatment of Apodaca, Justice Alito further expressed concern that a 
significant number of defendants convicted of felonies in Louisiana and 
Oregon by nonunanimous juries would challenge their convictions, 
which would unduly burden those states because they would be forced 
to retry many of the pending cases.55  In that regard, Louisiana and 
Oregon were relying on Apodaca	 remaining good law to assure the 
finality of the cases that would be affected by the majority’s decision.56  
The majority once again disagreed, reasoning that new rules of 
criminal procedure inevitably affect pending cases to some extent.57  If 
anything, the majority expected the Ramos decision to cause less 
disruption than other previous decisions on criminal procedure.58  More 
importantly, because Teague	v.	Lane59	prohibits retroactive application 
of rules of criminal procedure unless accepted as “watershed rules,” the 
majority surmised that the impact of its holding in Ramos	would be 
 
 52 On the contrary, stare decisis	is at its strongest in the realm of statutory law.  Amy 
Coney Barrett, Statutory	Stare	Decisis	in	the	Court	of	Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317 
(2005) [hereinafter Barrett, Statutory	Stare	Decisis].  
	 53	 Ramos, 140 S. Ct., at 1405. 
	 54	 Id. at 1405-06. 
 55 This is likely to happen because Oregon handed out felony convictions by 
nonunanimous juries in more than forty percent of all jury cases.  Kaplan and Saack, 
supra	note 12, at 19. 
	 56	 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1436 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
	 57	 Id. at 1406. 
	 58	 Id.	at 1406-07 (“Our decision here promises to cause less, and certainly nothing 
before us supports the dissent’s surmise that it will cause wildly more, disruption than 
these other decisions.”).  
 59 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).  
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narrowly limited in scope.60  The reliance interests of Louisiana and 
Oregon would be adequately addressed in a future case involving the 
question of whether the majority’s new rule passes the Teague	
threshold. 61   Ultimately, the majority concluded that the American 
people’s reliance in their constitutional liberties prevailed over 
whatever interest Louisiana and Oregon held in maintaining Apodaca as 
good law.62 
C. CONCURRING OPINIONS 
Justice Sotomayor, agreeing with all parts of Justice Gorsuch’s 
opinion except for its view on whether Apodaca was precedent, 
concurred in the opinion and offered scathing criticisms of Apodaca by 
listing three grounds on why it should be overturned.63  First, Apodaca 
directly violated well-established strands of constitutional precedent.64  
Second, stare	 decisis	 should be most respected in cases involving 
property and contract rights, but no such rights were implicated here.65  
Finally, because of their racist context, the laws of Louisiana and Oregon 
together with Apodaca should be “relegated to the dustbin of history.”66  
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas opined that the Court’s prior 
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment’s requirement for jury 
unanimity was permissible in light of the available evidence.67  Justice 
Thomas then, however, criticized the Court’s reliance on the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and instead argued for 
application of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.68  To Justice Thomas, 
“[d]ue process incorporation is a demonstrably erroneous 
 
	 60	 Id.  The dissenting Justices voiced concern that the mere possibility of retroactive 
application would cause an undue burden. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1437 (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(“As long as retroactive application on collateral review remains a real possibility, the 
crushing burden that this would entail cannot be ignored.”).  
	 61	 Id.	at 1407.  It appears that this question will be answered shortly, as the Court is 
currently reviewing whether the	Ramos rule passes the Teague threshold.  Amy Howe, 
Case	 preview:	 Justices	will	 hear	 argument	 on	whether	 unanimous	 jury	 ruling	 applies	
retroactively, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/12/case-
preview-justices-will-hear-argument-on-whether-unanimous-jury-ruling-applies-
retroactively/. 
	 62	 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1408.  
	 63	 Id.	at 1408 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
	 64	 Id. at 1409 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
	 65	 Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
	 66	 Id. at 1410 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  The dissent countered the third ground 
by casting doubt on the connection between the allegedly racist context and 
constitutional law and arguing that both states readopted their rules for policy-related 
but non-racist grounds.  Id. at 1426-27 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
	 67	 Id.	at 1424 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
	 68	 Ramos	140 S. Ct.	at 1424 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
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interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”69  Further, since in his 
view, Apodaca also erroneously concerned the Due Process Clause, 
Justice Thomas would have corrected the alleged error by assessing the 
issue under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.70  
In his concurring opinion, after emphasizing that “no one advocates 
that the Court should always overrule erroneous precedent,” Justice 
Kavanaugh offered a three-factor test for determining when to overturn 
precedent.71  Before all else, Justice Kavanaugh vouched for the need to 
respect precedent noting that even if stare decisis	is relatively weaker 
in the context of constitutional cases, as opposed to statutory cases 
where the legislative branch can correct its own statutes, “adherence to 
precedent is the norm” in both situations.72  In his opinion, the Court 
cannot overrule a precedent on the mere ground that it was wrongly 
decided.73   
But because the Court had failed to establish a clear, or even 
consistent, criteria regarding the stare decisis factors throughout the 
years, Justice Kavanaugh volunteered his own framework.  First, the 
decision at issue must be “grievously or egregiously wrong.”74  Second, 
the decision must have caused “significant negative jurisprudential or 
real-world consequences.”75  Lastly, overturning the decision must not 
lead to an undue disruption of reliance interests.76  In effect, what is left 
is a two-step test in which the Court must perform a threshold test on 
the wrongness of the decision, and then a totality-of-the-circumstances 
test regarding its past and future impact. 77   Justice Kavanaugh fully 
admitted the limitations of his test, particularly that it cannot eliminate 
disagreements between different Justices about the same case.78  When 
viewed in that light, perhaps the greatest merits of this approach lie in 
the trimming down of potential factors to consider whether to overturn 
precedent.  
 
	 69	 Id.	at 1424 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
	 70	 Id. at 1423-24 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
	 71	 Id. at 1412 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
	 72	 Id. at 1413 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
	 73	 Id. at 1414 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“To overrule, the Court demands a special 
justification or strong grounds.”). 
	 74	 Ramos,	140	S. Ct. at 1414 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
	 75	 Id. at 1415 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  
	 76	 Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
	 77	 Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 78 Specifically, the Court is bound to exercise discretion under this approach as well.  
Id. at 1415 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“[A]pplying those considerations is not a purely 
mechanical exercise, and I do not claim otherwise.  I suggest only that those three 
considerations may better structure how to consider the many traditional stare	decisis	
factors.”).  
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Justice Kavanaugh recognized the precedential force of Apodaca, 
but after applying his own test he concurred with the majority that it 
must be overturned.79  Under Justice Kavanaugh’s test: (1) Apodaca was 
egregiously wrong in view of the original meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment and prior and subsequent case law; (2) Apodaca	 caused 
serious negative consequences by enabling the conviction of individuals 
under an unconstitutional and racist rule, and; (3) overturning it would 
not overly upset reliance interests since the new rule would most likely 
not apply retroactively as a Teague	exception.80  In this manner, Ramos	
overturned Apodaca,	but only under deeply confusing circumstances.  
 
III. Deliberating	the	Future	of	Stare	Decisis	
A. DEFINING STARE DECISIS 
It would be an understatement to conclude that it is difficult to 
make sense of what Ramos	entails.  It is even more challenging to predict 
what will follow in the field of constitutional law, particularly with 
respect to the principle of stare decisis.  Known as the obligation to 
“stand by the thing decided and do not disturb the calm,”81 stare decisis 
is widely accepted as a distinctive feature of common law systems.82  In 
place to ensure that courts will decide similar cases in a consistent 
manner, in addition to promoting other crucial values, stare decisis is 
the legal principle for awarding precedential force to prior court 
decisions, and it transfers a court decision from the hands of the judge 
into the realm of either binding or strongly persuasive legal principles.83  
Put differently, stare decisis is what creates the notion of case law.84  
While precedent is respected in both common and civil law systems, 
 
	 79	 Id. at 1416 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
	 80	 Ramos,	140 S. Ct.	at 1419 (Kavanaugh J., concurring). 
 81 This is the Latin translation of the maxim “stare	decisis	et	non	quieta	movere.”  
James C. Rehnquist, The	Power	That	Shall	Be	Vested	 in	a	Precedent:	Stare	Decisis,	 the	
Constitution,	and	the	Supreme	Court, 66 B.U.L. REV. 345, 347 (1986). 
 82 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 21 (1973). 
	 83	 See	 also	 Rehnquist, supra	 note 81, at 347-48 (explaining that stare decisis is 
intended to promote values such as fairness, stability, predictability, and efficiency); 
Hughes, supra	note 27 (“Its formal ideology offers strong allegiance to the notion of the 
binding force of precedent, on the theory that a legal system must protect settled 
expectations which would be dangerously disturbed if the highest courts were free to 
abandon positions that they had earlier declared with authority.”).  
 84 As mentioned above, prior decisions in civil law jurisdictions, while highly 
persuasive, do not carry precedential force in the sense that prior decisions do not serve 
as binding legal principles on the courts.  FRIEDMAN, supra	note 82, at 22 (“In Continental 
law, all law (in theory) is contained in the codes.  In common law many basic rules of 
law are found nowhere but in the recorded opinion of the judges”).  
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stare decisis is distinguishable from the civil law doctrine of 
jurisprudence	constante	because under stare decisis even a single prior 
decision can be binding on subsequent courts.85 
To slightly digress, it is fascinating to trace the development of 
stare decisis in American jurisprudence since the Thirteen Colonies 
practically inherited the English legal system, including its preexisting 
case law and the doctrine of stare decisis.86  As one might expect, English 
precedents were strictly adhered to even after the American Revolution, 
and the overarching attitude toward the common law was that its rules 
came from natural law and were already in place for judges to 
discover.87  Because of this attitude courts were to strictly adhere to 
prior decisions, and as such judges did not “create” law. 88   But the 
situation transformed in the decades that followed.  Riding on the 
emerging belief that the common law was merely based on the 
voluntary consent of individuals, “judges began to conceive of 
themselves as the leading agents of legal change,” and simultaneously 
started to embrace their authority to reject precedents.89  Eventually, 
courts were no longer intimidated by stare decisis.90 
The law is by no means static, regardless of whether it takes the 
form of common or civil law.  The law as it is now is unlikely to be held 
to be true in the future, for changes routinely take place in the form of a 
statute, case law, or other mediums.  The law is constantly evolving and 
reflective of external circumstances, which are shaped by the social and 
political atmosphere surrounding the deliberation of each judge in 
rendering a final judgment.  To accommodate for the living nature of the 
law, stare decisis must not be imposed as an absolute obligation.91  In a 
sense stare decisis is a “compromise between the past and the future.”92  
But as is often the case with the law itself, stare decisis is noble in 
conception but flawed in execution.  Courts’ application of stare decisis 
 
 85 Fon & Parisi, supra	note 26, at 524 (explaining that under jurisprudence	constante 
precedent becomes a source of law only when there is a trend of similar decisions and a 
single decision by itself cannot achieve such effect). 
 86 Rehnquist, supra	note 81, at 348 (stating that stare decisis was carried over to the 
American Colonies).  
 87 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 5-8 (1977). 
	 88	 Id. at 9 (explaining that judges strictly followed precedent and saw their roles as 
discovering preexisting common law rules during the late Eighteenth Century).  
	 89	 Id. at 23, 26.  
	 90	 Id. at 30 (stating that judges thought of and used the common law to effectuate 
social change in the same manner as legislation).  
 91 Hughes, supra	note 27, at 20 (“The chains of precedent must not bind too tightly, 
and the doctrine of stare	decisis is not unyielding.”).  
 92 Todd E. Freed, Comment, Is	Stare	Decisis	Still	the	Lighthouse	Beacon	of	Supreme	
Court	Jurisprudence?:	A	Critical	Analysis, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1767, 1777 (1996). 
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can be wildly unpredictable and deeply confusing, and some have 
openly questioned the actual extent of its role in the American legal 
system. 93   More gravely, stare decisis can be thoroughly abused, 
allowing judges to conveniently point to the doctrine as legal 
justification for promoting his or her personal view of how the 
particular law at issue should be.  
In theory, of course, stare decisis requires courts to respect and 
uphold previous decisions notwithstanding whether they personally 
believe those decisions to be correct.94  Though not codified in statute, 
stare decisis is a rule stemming from the general practice of the courts 
and the structure of the common law system.  From a practical 
standpoint, stare decisis serves the purposes of “evenhandedness, 
predictability, and the protection and legitimate reliance.”95  From the 
train of thought offered by positivism, rules such as precedent are also 
crucial because they carry value as imposing obligations for judges to 
follow and restricting their discretion.96  
While stare decisis has obvious merits, the requirement that courts 
shall uphold a previous decision “simply because of its pastness” and in 
spite of knowing it to be wrong creates serious causes for concern.97  
Needless to say, courts would have made no progress whatsoever 
throughout the legal history of the U.S. had they blindly upheld prior 
decisions only because certain cases came first, but courts have played 
a vital, active role in bringing about legal progress.98  Despite support 
for stare decisis, the Court has also been celebrated for overturning 
prior decisions to promote developments in civil rights.  
Confusingly, a consensus is lacking even on the precise boundaries 
of the notion of stare decisis.99  To continue this discussion of Ramos and 
 
 93 Frederick Schauer, Stare	Decisis—Rhetoric	and	Reality	in	the	Supreme	Court, 2018 
SUP. CT. REV. 121, 130 (2019).  As this Article will explain, Justice Barrett is deeply critical 
of stare decisis as well.  
	 94	 Id. at 126 (“[T]he expectation embodied in the idea of stare decisis is that judges 
of a court will, presumptively even if not conclusively, follow the previous decisions of 
that court—by hypothesis and by definition no higher in the judicial hierarchy—even if 
and when they think the previous decisions are mistaken.”).  
	 95	 Ramos, 140 S. Ct., at 1429.  
	 96	 See	Stephen R. Perry, Judicial	Obligation,	Precedent	and	the	Common	Law, 7 OXFORD 
J. OF LEGAL STUD. 215, 215 (1987) (“Where a court is not bound by such a rule its decision 
always involves an exercise of discretion rather than compliance with any kind of 
obligation imposed by law.”).  
 97 Schauer, supra	note 93, at 125.  
 98 For a captivating account of this view in the context of the nascent decades of 
American legal development, see	generally	HORWITZ, supra note 87. 
 99 Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare	Decisis	and	Constitutional	Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 723, 763 (1988) (“The precedent has been viewed as limited to the “decision” on 
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its implications, we must broadly distinguish between two distinct 
forms of stare decisis.  The first form is vertical stare decisis.  The 
concept of vertical stare decisis is fairly straightforward and requires 
courts to adhere to decisions rendered by higher courts.100  The other 
form is horizontal stare decisis, which requires courts to follow 
precedent rendered by that particular court.101  Combined, vertical and 
horizontal stare decisis ensure that courts must heed their own past 
decisions or those by higher courts at all times.  
Once an absolute requirement, stare decisis—particularly in its 
horizontal form—has dwelt in the territory of legal uncertainty in recent 
American jurisprudence.  At times it is an unbending, unrelenting force 
of nature that precludes any deviations from the past.  Then, at other 
times, it is a red-headed stepchild, ignored and dismissed by a judge for 
the purposes of actualizing a specific objective.  Wildly, the role and 
application of stare decisis had fluctuated in this manner all the way to 
Ramos.  
B. STARE DECISIS AT THE SUPREME COURT  
In the case of the Supreme Court, vertical stare decisis is 
inapplicable since there is no higher court.  The Supreme Court is the 
ultimate source of vertical stare decisis for lower courts and is itself only 
subject to horizontal stare decisis.  Unfortunately, the interaction 
between Apodaca and Ramos highlights the difficult question of what 
constitutes precedent.  Stare decisis sheds little light on this issue for 
future courts in instances where previous judges offered different lines 
of reasoning, and where there is no obvious guidance for defining the 
extent of essential criteria that constitute binding precedent.102  As a 
result, there are no feasible means of accurately predicting when the 
Court will apply stare decisis and when stare decisis will be 
eschewed.103  This is an open-ended, potentially grave question that has 
created a tenuous relationship between past decisions and the current 
Court.104 
 
the “material facts” as seen by the precedent, or the same as seen by the non-precedent 
court; for others, the term means the “rules” formulated by the precedent court; for still 
others, the term includes the reasons given for the rules formulated.”).  
 100 Schauer, supra	note 93, at 124-25.  
 101 Schauer, supra	 note 93, at 125 (“Horizontal precedent—stare decisis—is the 
obligation of a court to follow the previous decisions of the same court.”).  
 102 Hughes, supra	note 27, at 19.  
 103 Monaghan, supra	note 99, at 743.  
 104 Randy E. Barnett, Trumping	Precedent	With	Original	Meaning:	Not	As	Radical	As	It	
Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 261 (2005) (“How and when precedent should be 
rejected remains one of the great unresolved controversies of jurisprudence.”).  
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As previously mentioned, as a general principle, the Court has 
traditionally given less weight to stare decisis in constitutional cases 
than in statutory cases.105  Still, this does not mean the Court has no 
qualms about overturning its earlier constitutional cases.  Rather, even 
in the realm of constitutional law, stare decisis remains the norm.106  As 
evidenced by the fact that Ramos was the only decision to overturn 
constitutional precedent during the Court’s previous term, 107  the 
consensus seems to be that stare decisis is still firmly entrenched in both 
theory and practice.108  
Even then, because of the absence of vertical stare decisis, stare 
decisis cannot restrict the Court to the same degree that it binds lower 
courts.  The doctrine’s legal effect is therefore significantly limited at the 
Supreme Court compared to any other court. 109   The Court cannot 
strictly apply stare decisis in all situations because individual Justices 
essentially have discretionalbeit with some theoretical 
restrictionson when to uphold existing precedent since there is no 
binding rule with respect to preexisting or closely related issues.110  In 
reality, stare decisis has not prevented Justices from working around 
the doctrine to independently craft legal opinions of their liking, 111 
despite persisting concerns that overturning precedent puts the Court’s 
legitimacy in question.112 
It is understandable then that some have called for the Court to 
completely abandon stare decisis,113 while others have suggested that 
 
 105 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997).  
 106 Freed, supra	note 92, at 1776.  
 107 Valerie C. Brannon, et al., Cong. Research Serv., R46562, Judge	Amy	Coney	Barrett:	
Her	 Jurisprudence	 and	 Potential	 Impact	 on	 the	 Supreme	 Court, 12 (Oct. 6, 2020), 
http://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46562. 
 108 Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent	and	 Jurisprudential	Disagreement, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
1711, 1728 (2013) [hereinafter Barrett, Precedent]. 
	 109	 Id. at 1713 (“In the Supreme Court, stare decisis is a soft rule; the Court describes 
it as one of policy rather than as an inexorable command.”).  
 110 Perry, supra	note 96, at 215 (explaining that courts always exercise at least some 
discretion if there is no binding rule).  
 111 Schauer, supra	note 93, at 131 (“As long as there are available in the decisional 
toolbox of the Justices multiple ways of rationalizing the avoidance of a seemingly 
applicable previous decision, the existence of that decision seldom stands as a 
significant barrier to what seems now to the Court or to individual Justices as the better 
decision to make, precedent aside, for the case before them.”). 
 112 For a succinct summary of this view, see	generally	Rehnquist, supra	note 81, at 
353-55.  And perhaps no one is more concerned about the legitimacy of the Court than 
Chief Justice John Roberts.  See	generally	Thomas J. Molony, Taking	Another	Look	at	the	
Call	on	the	Field:	Roe,	Chief	 Justice	John	Roberts,	and	Stare	Decisis, 43 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 733 (2020). 
 113 Rehnquist, supra	note 81, at 371-75.  
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Congress may abrogate stare decisis by statute.114  Nevertheless, the 
Court cannot simply rid of stare decisis altogether because doing so 
would place the innate value of precedent at peril.115  A number of other 
alternative suggestions have been raised, but none seem practical or 
even feasible.116  Evidently, stare decisis will remain a legal quagmire for 
the Court in the future. 
Against this backdrop, that some members of the Court declined to 
accept Apodaca	as binding precedent is a startling notion.117  Apodaca	
may very well have been an outlier in terms of the manner in which the 
Court was split and in its interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, but the 
implications of Ramos	 pertaining to stare decisis are nevertheless 
troublesome.118  It might be true that Justice Powell’s opinion stood on 
relatively shakier grounds than, say, a unanimous opinion by the Court.  
But there is certainly some merit to Justice Alito’s argument that 
Apodaca	was nonetheless binding as to its result.  If a single Justice 
cannot bind the Court by agreeing with a group of four other Justices 
with respect to the result, would two Justices suffice?  The lack of 
guidelines might give rise to a line-drawing problem because 
disagreements in the Court are to be expected.119 
Drawing lines in the Court is becoming increasingly challenging 
because of the politicization of the Court.120  To some, its politicization 
may very well be ominous.121  From the doomed attempt to appoint 
then-circuit judge Merrick Garland, to the bitter appointment of the 
three Trump-appointees, there is valid concern that the Court has 
become no more than another political arena, especially in light of the 
 
	 114	 See	generally	Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating	Stare	Decisis	by	Statute:	May	
Congress	Remove	the	Precedential	Effect	of	Roe	and	Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000).  
 115 Freed, supra	note 92, at 1780-81 (“[O]nce an absolute rule of stare decisis is 
dismissed, there is no objective yardstick for measuring adherence to the rule of 
precedent.”).  
	 116	 See Bradley S. Shannon, AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 504-05 (2015).  
 117 It is also unclear whether Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice 
Thomas view the concurring opinion or plurality opinion of Apodaca to be binding.  Sixth	
Amendment—Right	to	Jury	Trial—Nonunanimous	Juries—Ramos	v.	Louisiana, 134 HARV. 
L. REV. 520, 528-29 (2020) [hereinafter Sixth	Amendment]. 
	 118	 Cf.,	Freed, supra	note 92, at 1780 (explaining that stare decisis can be diminished 
once Justices begin to treat precedent lightly).  
	 119	 Sixth	Amendment, supra	note 117, at 520 (noting that “[p]lurality decisions are 
becoming more common” at the Court). 
 120 Epps & Sitaraman, supra	note 2, at 150 (“The predictable result is a Supreme Court 
whose Justices—on both sides—are more likely to vote along party lines than ever 
before in American history.”).  
 121 Epps and Sitaraman, supra note 2, at 151 (“[A] democracy that loses its confidence 
in law may not long survive.”).  
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significance of each Court decision on American politics.122  Although 
the battle at the Court begins with the nomination process—with some 
of the most recent confirmation hearings being downright ugly at 
times—once appointed, there is absolutely no question that the 
opinions of the Justices are shaped by their personal views and 
proclivities.123  
In recent years, following the retirement of Justice Anthony 
Kennedy and prior to the confirmation of Justice Barrett, there was 
rising optimism that Chief Justice John Roberts might serve as the swing 
vote,124 as well as corresponding skepticism.125  Where the truth lies will 
be discovered in the following years, but at the most fundamental level, 
it is plausible that Justice Roberts will usually be found somewhere in 
the middle.  The incompatible disagreements will originate from the 
extremes of the spectrum.126  
On the liberal end of the spectrum, even without the late Justice 
Ginsburg, the Justices deemed by many to be living constitutionalists 
run the risk of going too far.  For one thing, some have expressed hope 
that Justice Sotomayor will serve as a messenger for liberal Justices.127  
Alarmingly, Justice Sotomayor has been called upon for this role and 
celebrated for her non-academic appearances without regard to her 
specific views on the Constitution.128  It is not that Justice Sotomayor will 
 
 122 Jeremy Kidd, New	Metrics	and	the	Politics	of	Judicial	Selection, 70 ALA. L. REV. 785, 
811 (2019) (“Now that most of our most important political questions are destined to 
be decided by judges rather than by legislatures or bureaucrats, those who seek political 
outcomes must care about the political preferences of the judges.”).  
 123 Jeffrey F. Addicott, Reshaping	American	Jurisprudence	in	the	Trump	Era	–	The	Rise	
of	“Originalist”	Judges, 55 CAL. W. L. REV. 341, 346 (2019) (“[E]veryone understands that 
the “law they follow” is often dictated by their positions set along an ideological 
spectrum, which ranges from the conservative “originalist” interpretation of the 
Constitution to the liberal living “constitutionalist,” i.e., a “living, breathing” document 
view of the Constitution.”). 
 124 Adam Liptak, In	a	Term	Full	of	Major	Cases,	the	Supreme	Court	Tacked	to	the	Center, 
THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jul. 10, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/10/us/supreme-court-term.html.  
 125 Victoria Bassetti, John	Roberts	is	an	Institutionalist,	Not	a	Liberal, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Jul. 1, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/2248b2e3-b911-48ec-9eeb-
632c0c26ab16. 
 126 As a reminder, only Justice Gorsuch, Justice Breyer, and the late Justice Ginsburg 
concluded that Apodaca	was not precedent.  The remaining six Justices agreed that 
Apodaca	was indeed precedent, but only three of them believed that it should be upheld. 
 127 David Fontana, The	 People’s	 Justice?, 123 YALE L.J. FORUM 447, 471 (2014) 
(“Sotomayor could make the message of liberal Justices more appealing by affiliating it 
with an appealing messenger.”).  
 128 Whereas other Justices are similarly labeled as conservative or liberal, Justice 
Sotomayor seemingly does not even need the pretenses of referring to the Constitution 
to promote her liberal views.  Id. at 473 (“Unlike Justice Scalia’s originalism, Justice 
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lean toward rendering a liberal legal opinion because her jurisprudence 
and trained reading of the Constitution leads her down that path.  She 
will probably do so because she is	 liberal per	 se, an observation that 
blurs the line between the law and the person applying it.129  And the 
path Justice Sotomayor took in	Ramos is no friend of stare decisis.130 
On the other end, besides the old conservative vanguards Justice 
Thomas and Justice Alito, 131  the Trump-appointed Justices are still 
something of an unknown commodity. 132   Notably, both Justice 
Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch are adherents to the school of 
originalism, although how faithful they remain to the philosophy is 
debatable. 133   For Justice Kavanaugh, Apodaca undeniably carried 
precedential force, but the decision still deserved to be overturned.134  
Perhaps his new three-factor test is intended to simplify the process for 
overturning precedent to make it more convenient in future cases.135  
Nevertheless, it is interesting that those two originalist Justices—Justice 
Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh—ultimately voted to endorse jury 
unanimity, either by overturning or circumventing precedent, which, as 
previously discussed, is undoubtedly closer to the original 
understanding of the Sixth Amendment than the outcome of Apodaca	
was.136  
 
Breyer’s pragmatism, or even Justice Souter’s fair reading model, there is little in what 
she states in her extrajudicial remarks that indicates a brave new theory of the Court or 
the Constitution.”).  
 129 Justice Sotomayor has previously explained her approach to deciding cases in 
terms of her personal convictions rather than her constitutional views.  Id.	at 467. 
 130 Nina Varsava, Precedent	on	Precedent, 169 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 118, 132 (2020) 
(“This standard would set a relatively low bar for overruling precedent in the criminal 
procedure realm.”).  
 131 There is an argument that Justice Thomas, for what it is worth, would give 
“effectively no binding force to precedent.”		Id. at 132.   
 132 The emerging narrative has been that Justice Kavanagh or Justice Gorsuch could 
serve as the new swing vote, instead of Justice Roberts, when it comes to particular areas 
of the law.  See	generally	Daniel Harris, The	New	Swing	Votes	on	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court, 
114 NW. U. L. REV. 258 (2020).  
	 133	 See	generally	Addicott, supra	note 123.  
	 134	 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1419 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (asking why the Court should 
“stick by an erroneous precedent that is egregiously wrong as a matter of constitutional 
law, that allows convictions of some who would not be convicted under the proper 
constitutional rule, and that tolerates and reinforces a practice that is thoroughly racist 
in its origins and has continuing racially discriminatory effects?”).  
	 135	 Cf. Varsava, supra	 note 130, at 131 (Justice Kavanaugh’s preference for 
streamlining the framework for overturning precedent might be to “clear the air for 
future decisions in which he plans to vote to overrule precedent”).  
 136 From their perspective, perhaps Apodaca had to be overturned because it, in 
effect, involved the Court positively affirming a departure from the original meaning of 
the Sixth Amendment.  Larsen, supra	note 10, at 984 (“[O]riginalism typically is quite 
comfortable with change; its only enemy is change imposed by judges.”). 
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For originalists such as Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh, it 
could be that their self-prescribed duty is to correct the Court’s 
jurisprudence in accordance with the original meaning of the 
Constitution.137  Apodaca, for example, had to be overturned because it 
conflicted with the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment regarding 
jury unanimity. 138   But originalism is patently inconsistent with the 
Court-led social changes that have taken place over the past decades.139  
Thus the popular narrative post-Ramos that Justice Kagan may have 
sided with the dissenters	in order ask them to respect stare decisis later 
down the road for cases involving abortion, LGBT, and other rights in a 
similar vein makes sense, 140  even though Justice Alito and Justice 
Roberts might not reciprocate because of their acknowledgement that 
Ramos itself is now binding precedent.141 
All of these fundamental disagreements among the Court are likely 
to be aggravated by the passing of Justice Ginsburg—a defining figure in 
battling sex discrimination laws and a promoter of social change142—
and her replacement by Justice Barrett.  This replacement will lead to a 
worsening ideological clash between the Justices on significant social 
rights developments that were implemented and enforced directly by 
the Court during the Twentieth Century.143  For liberals in particular, the 
current makeup of the Court is bound to be extremely concerning.144  
 
 137 Barnett, supra	note 104, at 269 (“Where a determinate original meaning can be 
ascertained and is inconsistent with previous judicial decisions, these precedents should 
be reversed and the original meaning adopted in their place.”).  
	 138	 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1396-97.  
	 139	 See Monaghan, supra	note 99, at 739.  
 140 Sam Berten, The	 Long	 Game:	 Justice	 Kagan’s	 Approach	 in	 Ramos	 v.	 Louisiana, 
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW (May 26, 2020), 
https://www.uclawreview.org/2020/05/26/the-long-game-Justice-kagans-approach-
in-ramos-v-louisiana; Ed Whelan, Justice	Kagan	and	Stare	Decisis, NATIONAL REVIEW (Apr. 
20, 2020) https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/Justice-kagan-and-stare-
decisis/. 
	 141	 See Varsava, supra	 note 130, at 132 (“[T]o the extent that Ramos	 has set a 
precedent about precedent, it is the Justices in the dissent who will feel most compelled 
to follow it going forward—after all, they apparently endorse a stricter approach to 
precedent than any of the other Justices.”). 
	 142	 See	generally	Michael J. Klarman, Social	Reform	Litigation	and	Its	Challenges:	An	
Essay	in	Honor	of	Justice	Ruth	Bader	Ginsburg, 32 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 251 (2009).  
	 143	 See Monaghan, supra note 99, at 728 (“In addition to Brown, it seems evident that 
the abortion cases, the reapportionment cases, and the sex discrimination cases are also 
inconsistent with any constrained conception of the original understanding.”).  
 144 This was the case even before Justice Barrett’s ascension from the Seventh Circuit.  
See Epps & Sitaraman, supra	note Error!	Bookmark	not	defined., at 168 (“The new 
Supreme Court majority is arguably the most reliably conservative in history, and there 
is reason to believe it will strike down laws that progressives favor using doctrinal 
theories that are at least open to a serious question.”).  
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Justice Gorsuch’s degeneration of stare decisis in this context might 
cause even greater doubts.  Where the Justices diverge greatly on their 
views on a particular case or issue, stare decisis is capable of performing 
a crucial role by mediating between the two extremes and enabling 
them to sidestep certain delicate legal issues.145  Stare decisis would 
thus effectively act as an equalizer by forcing Justices with contrasting 
opinions to grudgingly agree to maintain the status quo out of respect 
for precedent.  With a blatantly conservative Court, however, liberal 
circles fear that many of the Court-led social changes could be 
undone.146  Whether their fear will hold true is yet to be determined.147  
For instance, at the end of Ramos Justice Gorsuch concluded the 
majority opinion by stating, “it is something else entirely to perpetuate 
something we all know to be wrong only because we fear the 
consequences of being right.”148  But the nine Justices currently sitting 
on the Court will unquestionably disagree on what is right or wrong, and 
with their conflicting views, stare decisis alone will be insufficient to 
lead them into reaching an agreement.  Since it is plausible that one or 
more vacancies will occur in the near future, this predicament could 
worsen because of the disparity between the rising influence of the 
Justices and the difficulty of accurately ascertaining their political 
preferences before appointment.149  And if Justices can circumvent stare 
decisis altogether, à la Justice Gorsuch in Ramos,150 an even murkier 
 
	 145	 See	generally, Precedent,	Barrett, supra	note 108, at 1716-25.  Stare decisis could 
also mediate between Justices with conflicting opinions by allowing them to opt for the 
status quo so that the issue may be addressed again in the future.  See	Barrett, Precedent, 
supra	note 108, at 1724.  
 146 Joan Biskupic, The	Supreme	Court	Hasn’t	Been	this	Conservative	Since	the	1930s, 
CNN, Sept. 26, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/26/politics/supreme-court-
conservative/index.html; Adam Liptak, Barrett’s	 Record:	 A	 Conservative	Who	Would	
Push	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 To	 The	 Right, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/12/us/politics/barretts-record-a-conservative-
who-would-push-the-supreme-court-to-the-right.html. 
 147 So far, the liberal side of the Court attained a noteworthy victory in Bostock	v.	
Clayton	 County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).  In that case, the majority, against three 
dissenting Justices in Justice Alito, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Thomas, held that 
employers may not fire employees for being gay or transgender under Title VIII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Id. at 1754.  That, of course, was before Justice Barrett’s 
confirmation.  
	 148	 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1390, 1408. 
 149 Kidd, supra	note 122, at 811.  
 150 Varsava, supra	note 130, at 132-33 (explaining that both the majority and the 
dissenting Justices are likely to follow the “relaxed doctrine of precedent”).	
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future might be waiting ahead for the Court in light of Justice Barrett’s 
views on stare decisis.151 
C. ENTER JUSTICE BARRETT: WHAT COMES AFTER RAMOS? 
Ramos	laid the groundwork for hacking away at the notion of what 
constitutes precedent, and what happens from here will heavily depend 
on Justice Barrett.  During her nomination and confirmation process 
much was made of her religious upbringing and personal views. 152  
Many believed those factors telegraphed a willingness—if not intent—
to overturn the Court’s previous rulings on issues such as the Affordable 
Care Act or abortion. 153   These concerns stemmed from the widely 
accepted perception of Justice Barrett,154 famously known for being a 
former law clerk of Justice Scalia, 155  as a staunch originalist and 
textualist.156  In her own words, Justice Barrett’s legal philosophy can be 
summarized as the belief that “the meaning of the constitutional text is 
fixed at the time of its ratification” and the historical meaning of the text 
should be controlling.157 
 
 151 This is separate from the intriguing and confusing inquiry of whether “Ramos 
could be applied to Ramos	 itself to justify a departure from the Ramos approach to 
precedent.”  Varsava, supra	note 130, at 133.  
 152 For a succinct summary of Justice Barrett’s upbringing, see	generally	Elizabeth 
Dias et al., Rooted	in	Faith,	Representing	a	New	Conservatism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/11/us/politics/amy-coney-barrett-life-career-
family.html. 
 153 Amy Goldstein & Alice Crites, Judge	Barrett’s	writing	criticizes	the	Supreme	Court	
decision	 upholding	 Obama‐era	 health	 law, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2020, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/judge-barrett-aca-health-care-
law/2020/09/28/429d165e-ff4c-11ea-b555-4d71a9254f4b_story.html; Emma Green, 
No	 One	 Likes	 Amy	 Coney	 Barrett’s	 Abortion	 Answer, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 13, 2020, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/10/amy-coney-barrett-roe-v-
wade/. 
 154 Barrett, Precedent, supra	note 108, at 1075 (“Reliance interests count, but they 
count far less when precedent clearly exceeds a court’s interpretive authority than they 
do when precedent, though perhaps not the ideal choice, was nonetheless within the 
court’s discretion.”). 
 155 On Justice Scalia, she previously stated, “[h]is judicial philosophy is mine too.”  
Remarks	by	President	Trump	Announcing	His	Nominee	for	Associate	Justice	of	the	Supreme	
Court	 of	 the	 United	 States, TRUMP WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVE, 
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-
trump-announcing-nominee-associate-justice-supreme-court-united-states/ (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2021). 
 156 Upon her nomination, Justice Barrett affirmed this perception that a “judge must 
apply the law as written,” while former President Trump added that she “will decide 
cases based on the text of the Constitution as written.”  Id. 
 157 Amy Coney Barrett & John Copeland Nagle, Congressional	Originalism, 19 J. CONST. 
L. 1, 5 (2016). 
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Understandably, Justice Barrett’s originalist views have been 
criticized for being badly outdated and logically inconsistent.158  And 
despite Justice Barrett’s ardent defense, 159  Justice Scalia’s purported 
“pragmatic” application of originalism was in itself inherently 
discretionary.160  This was no more evident than in his wish to ignore 
the Ninth Amendment altogether.161  But with life tenure and a solidly 
conservative majority now occupying the Court, whatever logical holes 
that can be found in originalism will have very little consequences 
outside of the academic circle.  
So what does Justice Barrett, the author of several articles on the 
topic, think of stare decisis?  Justice Barrett’s articles yield the 
conclusion that her views on stare decisis have been remarkably 
consistent, and that she has been anything but a proponent for its rigid 
application.  First, she is skeptical that stare decisis is a firmly 
established rule with deep historical roots.162  The notion of a single case 
binding successive courts,163 Justice Barrett argues, pales in comparison 
to the civil law system in which only a series of similar holdings can 
 
 158 Erwin Chemerinsky, The	Philosophy	That	Makes	Amy	Coney	Barrett	So	Dangerous, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/opinion/supreme-
court-amy-coney-barrett.html.  The existence of the U.S. Air Force would be 
unconstitutional under a textualist and originalist interpretation of the Constitution.  
Angus King Jr, Amy	Coney	Barrett’s	Judicial	Philosophy	Doesn’t	Hold	Up	to	Scrutiny, THE 
ATLANTIC, Oct. 25, 2020, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/10/originalism-barrett/616844.  
For her part, Justice Barrett believes the creation of the U.S. Air Force is a “super 
precedent” created by Congress and the President. Barrett & Nagle, supra	note 157, at 
24-25.  
 159 Justice Barrett especially insists that Justice Scalia was selective in overturning 
precedent.  Amy Coney Barrett, Originalism	and	 Stare	Decisis, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1921, 1933 (2017) [hereinafter Barrett, Originalism] (“He was willing to overrule 
precedent outright in the above cases because he thought that the error was clear and 
that traditional stare decisis factors like reliance or workability counseled it.”).  
 160 Notably, Justice Scalia himself confessed that totality of the circumstances tests 
are inevitable to a certain extent.  Antonin Scalia, The	Rule	of	Law	as	a	Law	of	Rules, 56 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1187 (1989).  Justice Scalia also once wrote that “no reasonable jury 
could conclude otherwise” regarding the applicable facts when not even all nine 
members of the Court had agreed.  Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007).  
 161 Ken Levy, Why	the	Late	Justice	Scalia	Was	Wrong:	The	Fallacies	of	Constitutional	
Textualism, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 45, 69–70 (2017) (“Apparently, Justice Scalia’s meta-
constitutional position was that when the facts inconveniently threaten your 
constitutional theory, simply pick different facts.”).  
 162 Amy Coney Barrett, Stare	Decisis	and	Due	Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1065 
(2003) [hereinafter Barrett, Stare	Decisis] (explaining that stare decisis is deemed to be 
a relatively modern rule in American jurisprudence).  
 163 Justice Barrett is presumably critical of this notion.  See	Barrett and Nagle, supra	
note 157, at 43 (“The question whether settled precedents constitute “law” in a positivist 
sense is a complicated jurisprudential one that we do not tackle.”). 
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carry precedential force. 164   Second, she is of the view that the 
application of stare decisis, even with regard to statutory cases, should 
be limited.165  Third, she frowns upon stare decisis’s practicality because 
she believes it limits the number of arguments litigants could raise in 
their own case, 166  and therefore, it must be applied in a flexible 
manner.167  As did her ideological mentor Justice Scalia, Justice Barrett 
simultaneously acknowledges a tension between stare decisis and 
originalism,168 and would unwaveringly strike down a case she believes 
to be in conflict with the Constitution. 169   Where the conflict is 
demonstrable, Justice Barrett would give little, if any, weight to reliance 
interests.170 
But unlike Justice Scalia, who reconciled this conflict by labelling 
stare decisis as a pragmatic exception to his views,171 Justice Barrett 
does so by perceiving—or construing—a harmony between originalism 
and stare decisis. 172   Because the Constitution is the “original 
precedent,” she concludes there is no per	 se conflict between the 
principles of stare decisis and originalism.173  If a decision is consistent 
with the originalist reading of the Constitution, then all is right in Justice 
Barrett’s world.  To the extent that there is any inconsistency, the 
originalist reading of the Constitution must prevail as the original 
precedent.  By restoring the text and original meaning of the 
Constitution, a judge therefore does not disregard stare decisis, but in 
 
 164 Justice Barrett seems almost envious of the civil law approach.  See	Barrett, Stare	
Decisis, supra	note 162, at 1067, 1072-1073 (stating that in a civil law system “[T]he 
court’s only real tools for gauging the persuasiveness of an argument are the litigants’ 
arguments and the original text” and like jurisprudence	constante, a line of judgments is 
what gives a rule precedential force because “[i]t is the existence of the line of cases, not 
any one case, that gives a proposition its force”).   
 165 Barrett, Statutory	Stare	Decisis, supra	note 52, at 352 (arguing that there is no 
reason for statutory stare decisis at the circuit court level to be “anything more than the 
simple presumption against overruling that all opinions enjoy”). 
 166 Barrett, Stare	Decisis, supra	note 162, at 1075 (criticizing the role of stare decisis 
because “litigants are bound to results obtained by those who have gone before them”). 
 167 Barrett, Stare	Decisis, supra note 162, at 1013.  
 168 Barrett, Precedent, supra	note 108, at 1724. 
 169 Barrett, Precedent, supra	note 108, at 1728 (“I tend to agree with those who say 
that a justice’s duty is to the Constitution and that it is thus more legitimate for her to 
enforce her best understanding of the Constitution rather than a precedent she thinks 
clearly in conflict with it.”).  
 170 Barrett, Stare	Decisis, supra note 162, at 1062.  
 171 Barrett, Originalism, supra	note 159, at 1921–22.  
 172 Barrett, Originalism, supra	note 159, at 1923 (“Originalism thus places a premium 
on precedent, and to the extent that originalists reject the possibility of deviating from 
historically-settled meaning, one could say that their view of precedent is particularly 
strong, not as weak as their critics often contend.”).  
 173 Barrett, Originalism, supra	note 159, at 1924. 
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fact adheres to the ultimate precedent.  The fact that Justice Barrett does 
not see a conflict here means she would have fewer reservations than 
her mentor about overturning precedent. 
Nevertheless, according to Justice Barrett, the concerns 
surrounding the conservative shaping of the Court may very well be 
overblown because there are safeguards in place that would limit the 
number of challenges to duly established precedent.174  Conveniently, 
stare decisis cannot clash with originalism if the question of whether 
such “super precedent” contravenes the Constitution does not arise in 
the first place.175  Nor can the Court arbitrarily overturn previous cases 
in defiance of the general public’s strong support for them.176  
But critically, Justice Barrett candidly recognizes how the Court has 
discretion to hear cases of its choice.177  Thus while the Court would 
generally refrain from accepting cases on which the general public has 
reached a universal consensus, it has discretion to hear those it believes 
to be in the gray zone.  And as far as she is concerned, although 
originalism does not obligate a Justice to eliminate all past decisions he 
or she disagrees with, even duly established precedent is not immune.178  
Moreover, it is evident that Justice Barrett does not deem cases such as 
 
 174 Barrett, Originalism, supra	note 159, at 1929 (“A combination of rules—some 
constitutional, some statutory, and some judicially adopted—keep most challenges to 
precedent off the Court’s agenda.”).  
 175 Justice Barrett’s view is that super precedent is created not by stare decisis but by 
its duly established status. Barrett and Nagle, supra	note 157, at 22–23.  Barrett and 
Nagle, supra	 note 157, at 16–17 (explaining that the criticism of originalism as 
misaligning with its principles with respect to super precedent is “contrived”).  
 176 Barrett, Precedent, supra	note 108, at 1736 (explaining that strong public support 
in cases such as Brown	v.	Board	of	Education prevents any challenges from reaching the 
Court).  
 177 Barrett, Originalism, supra	 note 159, at 1930 (“[T]he Court’s discretionary 
jurisdiction generally permits it to choose which questions it wants to answer.”); 
Barrett, Stare	Decisis, supra	note 162, at 1015-16.  
 178 Barrett & Nagle, supra	notes 157, at 20, 22 (explaining that a Justice has discretion 
over seeking to overturn even super precedents despite the aforementioned safeguards 
in place).  
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Roe	 v.	 Wade 179 	or Planned	 Parenthood	 v.	 Casey 180 	to be super 
precedents,181 as opposed to Marbury	v.	Madison,182 for example.183 
Returning to the case at hand, while it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to accurately predict how she would have voted as a Supreme Court 
Justice, we may nevertheless attempt to ascertain which side Justice 
Barrett might have joined in Ramos. 184   Judging by her own words, 
Justice Barrett’s analytic checklist should consist of applicable 
precedent, and then the textualist and originalist readings of the Sixth 
Amendment. 185   The threshold question is whether Justice Barrett 
would have deemed Apodaca	to be binding precedent.186  On this point, 
common sense suggests she would have sided with Justice Gorsuch 
considering Apodaca’s status as an obvious outlier in the Court’s 
jurisprudence and the peculiar nature of Justice Powell’s opinion. 187  
Turning to the textualist and originalist analyses, determining how 
Justice Barrett might have opined becomes far more difficult because 
unlike the original meaning of the term “impartial,” as recognized by the 
Ramos	majority, the plain text of the Sixth Amendment does not require 
jury unanimity.188  In that sense there is a clash between a textualist 
reading and an originalist one,189 which means we have reached the 
point where the general principle has gone “as far as it can go in 
 
 179 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 180 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
	 181	 See,	e.g., Barrett, Originalism, supra note 159, at 1932, n.52; Barrett, Precedent, 
supra	 note 108, at 1735, n.141.  During her confirmation hearings, Justice Barrett 
pointed to the fact that Roe	v.	Wade	is continuously at the center of debate as proof it has 
not achieved super precedent status.  Brian Naylor, Barrett	Says	She	Does	Not	Consider	
Roe	 v.	 Wade	 ‘Super‐Precedent,’ NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 13, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/live-amy-coney-barrett-supreme-court-
confirmation/2020/10/13/923355142/barrett-says-abortion-rights-decision-not-a-
super-precedent.  At the same time, it has been pointed out that Justice Barrett’s 
purported dedication to originalism should, in theory, lead her to conclude that super 
precedents such as Brown	 v.	 Board should be overturned as well.  See	 King Jr. & 
Richardson, supra	note 158. 
 182 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 183 Justice Barrett offered the following Supreme Court decisions as examples of 
super precedents which are extremely unlikely to be overturned: Marbury	v.	Madison, 
Martin	v.	Hunter’s	Lessee, Helvering	v.	Davis, the Legal	Tender	Cases, Mapp	v.	Ohio, Brown	
v.	Board	of	Education, and the Civil	Rights	Cases.  Barrett & Nagle, supra	note 157, at 14.  
	 184	 See	Brannon et al., supra	note 107, at 5-7.  
	 185	 See Brannon et al., supra note 107,	at 20 (quoting Justice Barrett’s response during 
her confirmation hearing for the Seventh Circuit).  
	 186	 See	 Brannon et al., supra	 note 107, at 20 (quoting Justice Barrett as stating 
whether precedent settles the issue is the preliminary question).  
	 187	 See	Barrett, Stare	Decisis, supra	note 162, at 1073.  
 188 Mosvick & Mosvick, supra	note 36, at 310-11.  
 189 Even critics of the holding of Ramos agree that the requirement of jury unanimity 
was the consensus at least in 1791.  Mosvick & Mosvick, supra	note 36,	at 323. 
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substantial furtherance of the precise statutory or constitutional 
prescription.” 190   All that is left is for Justice Barrett to exercise 
discretion, for which there are no means of accurately ascertaining her 
thoughts.  Such discretion, rather than concrete legal principles, will 
likely decide a great number of social and political issues for decades to 
come. 
The best we can do to try to trace her thoughts is to turn to some of 
the opinions Justice Barrett personally penned during her short stay at 
the Seventh Circuit.191  For that purpose her dissenting opinions might 
be more illuminating than any majority or concurring opinion. 192  
Although Apodaca’s status as an obvious outlier would likely preclude 
Justice Barrett from acknowledging it as binding precedent, her 
dissenting opinion in Schmidt	v.	Foster193 suggests she would construe 
the holding of Apodaca quite narrowly even if she were to consider it	
precedential.  To briefly summarize her dissenting opinion in Schmidt, 
Justice Barrett diverged from the majority on whether the Supreme 
Court’s precedent on the right to counsel at a “critical stage” under the 
Sixth Amendment applied to the petitioner’s situation.194 
In Schmidt, the petitioner was charged with first-degree intentional 
homicide and raised a provocation defense; as a result, the judge 
decided to preliminarily question the petitioner in-person to assess the 
validity of the petitioner’s claim.195  Ultimately, the judge denied the 
motion to present a provocation defense after questioning the 
petitioner in his chambers in the presence of the petitioner’s counsel—
who did not speak—and without the prosecutor.196   Based on these 
 
 190 Scalia, supra	note 160, at 1183. 
 191 In roughly three years, Justice Barrett wrote about 100 majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions. Adam Feldman, Empirical	SCOTUS:	A	Comprehensive	Look	at	Judge	
Amy	 Coney	 Barrett, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 9, 2020), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10/empirical-scotus-a-comprehensive-look-at-
judge-amy-coney-barrett/.  See Barrett, Precedent, supra	note 108, at 1717 (stating that 
a Justice’s “approach to the Constitution becomes evident in the opinion she writes.”). 
 192 It is the shared opinion of liberal and conservative Justices alike that they can 
most clearly and strongly express their legal reasoning in dissenting opinions.  See	
William J. Brennan Jr., In	Defense	of	Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 435 (1986) (“[W]here 
significant and deeply held disagreement exists, members of the Court have a 
responsibility to articulate it.”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The	Role	of	Dissenting	Opinions, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2010) (“[A]lthough I appreciate the value of unanimous opinions, I will 
continue to speak in dissent when important matters are at stake.”); Antonin Scalia, The	
Dissenting	Opinion, 19 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 42 (1994) (stating that is a pleasure “[t]o be 
able to write an opinion solely for oneself”).  
 193 Schmidt v. Foster, 891 F.3d 302 (7th. Cir. 2018).  
	 194	 Id.	at 321 (Barrett, J., dissenting). 
	 195	 Id. at 306-07. 
	 196	 Id. at 307-08. 
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facts, the majority held the judge’s rejection of the defense was contrary 
to Supreme Court precedent,197 and deprived the petitioner of his right 
to counsel under the Sixth Amendment during a critical stage of the 
proceeding.198  
In her dissenting opinion, however, Justice Barrett interpreted the 
relevant Supreme Court cases differently and more narrowly, reaching 
the conclusion that precedent on what constitutes a critical stage is 
strictly limited to “adversarial confrontations between the defendant 
and an agent of the State.”199  Since the prosecutor was not present for 
the interrogation within the judge’s chambers and the judge acted in a 
neutral rather than adversarial manner, Justice Barrett disagreed with 
the majority that the interrogation was a critical stage. 200  What we 
might take from Schmidt is that Justice Barrett, faithful to her general 
disinclination for stare decisis, would lean toward construing any 
applicable precedent extremely narrowly where it does exist.201 
Justice Barrett’s dissenting opinion in the 2019 case of Kanter	v.	
Barr202 could offer further hints as to how she might determine the 
original meaning of the Constitution.  In Kanter, the Wisconsin state and 
federal statutes at issue prohibited all persons convicted of a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year from possessing 
firearms. 203   The statutes’ reach covered the petitioner, who had 
previously been convicted and imprisoned for one year and one day for 
a non-violent crime.204  Applying the post-Heller two-part test,205 the 
majority looked to historical evidence of non-violent felons being 
 
	 197	 Id. at 314 (“By looking both at what the Supreme Court has done and at what it 
has said, it is clear that an evidentiary hearing on a contested substantive issue is a 
critical stage of the proceedings.”).  
	 198	 Id. at 319-20.  
	 199	 Schmidt, 891 F.3d at 321.  
	 200	 Id.	at 321, 327-28.	
 201 Still, as Ramos concerned the exact same issue as Apodaca, it would have been 
difficult for her to distinguish between the two.  The factual differences worth noting 
can be summarized as the crimes the petitioners were charged with, with Apodaca 
featuring assault, burglary, and grand larceny instead of murder, and that one of the 
petitioners in Apodaca was convicted by an 11-1 vote rather than 10-2.  See Apodaca, 
406 U.S. at 405-06. 
	 202	 See	Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 451 (7th Cir. 2019).  
	 203	 Id. at 439.  
 204 Specifically, the petitioner had faced up to twenty years for mail fraud.  Id. at 440. 
 205 In assessing the constitutionality of a statute restricting the right to bear firearms, 
the Court conducts a textual and historical analysis on whether the regulated activity is 
within the scope of the Second Amendment, and if not, the Court then balances the 
justification for regulating the activity with an individual’s rights under the Second 
Amendment.  Id.	at 441 (explaining the Heller	test). 
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prevented from exercising their Second Amendment rights, before 
ultimately upholding the constitutionality of the statutes.206 
The majority’s historical analysis invited strong disagreement from 
Justice Barrett.  In her view, her colleagues on the bench were mistaken 
in suggesting that felons may not have had the right to bear arms per the 
original understanding of the Second Amendment.207   Validating the 
constitutionality of the concerned statutes through a historical analysis 
would require the existence of “founding-era laws explicitly imposing—
or explicitly authorizing the legislature to impose—such a ban,” none of 
which Justice Barrett believed existed.208  Placing utmost significance on 
the plain text of the Second Amendment,209 Justice Barrett narrowly 
read the proposals made in the few states that provided “the only 
evidence coming remotely close” to such laws and declined to view them 
as supporting a restriction on the right of nonviolent felons to bear 
firearms.210  
Reading Schmidt and Kanter	together, a couple of observations can 
be drawn.  First, Justice Barrett seems likely to lean toward interpreting 
applicable precedent and facts on the narrowest possible grounds.  
Consistent with her views on stare decisis, this might be an attempt to 
limit the binding effect of precedent as much as possible.  Second, as 
expected, Justice Barrett will heavily rely on the text of the Constitution 
in construing it, perhaps even over its historical context.  That would 
especially be the case if, as with the legislative history of the Sixth 
Amendment, there is ample room to argue both ways.211  Applied to 
Ramos, the first point is irrelevant because Apodaca’s status as an 
obvious outlier and the ambiguity of whether the Marks rule should 
apply to Justice Powell’s opinion would enable her to avoid applying 
Apodaca	 as binding precedent.  Even though it would be nearly 
 
 206 While noting how the Seventh Circuit has suggested that the original meaning of 
the Second Amendment was to award the right to bear arms to only virtuous citizens, 
the inconclusive historical evidence allowed the majority to proceed to the second step 
of the inquiry.  Id. at 445-47. 
 207 Justice Barrett summarized her opinion of the issue of this case as “the question 
is whether the government has the power to disable the exercise of a right that they 
otherwise possess, rather than whether they possess the right at all.”  Id. at 453. 
	 208	 Kanter, 919 F.3d at 454.  
 209 New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania each submitted proposals that 
contained language restricting the right of felons to bear arms, but Justice Barrett 
downplayed them based on a textualist argument that “none of the relevant limiting 
language made its way into the Second Amendment.”  Id.	at 455.  
	 210	 Id.	at 454, 458 (concluding that the restriction on the right to bear arms pertained 
to individuals posing “a threat to the public safety” instead of all felons in a categorical 
sense). 
	 211	 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 409 (stating that “one can draw conflicting inferences from 
this legislative history”). 
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impossible to distinguish the holding of Apodaca from that of Ramos, 
Justice Barrett would, in all likelihood, simply refuse to give stare decisis 
treatment to Apodaca.  Rather, the second point would presumably 
control Justice Barrett’s analysis, and the reality of the requirement of 
jury unanimity being absent in the final text could persuade Justice 
Barrett to disagree with the majority in Ramos.212  Justice Barrett might 
reason that jury unanimity in state courts is not in line with the “original 
precedent.”  But in the end, any predictions as to what Justice Barrett 
might have done are not, and simply cannot be predicated upon exact 
science.  Depending on who you ask, that is the beauty, or innate 
shortcoming, of law. 
IV. Conclusion	
“It is my job to apply the law,” Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is 
famously said to have declared in response to Judge Learned Hand’s 
request that the towering legal figure “[d]o Justice.”213  The unfortunate 
truth is that such a simple and noble task becomes exponentially more 
difficult when there is no agreement on how the law should be applied, 
or even what the law is.  
The direct impact of Ramos is certainly forthcoming.214  As feared 
by Justice Alito, defendants previously convicted by nonunanimous 
juries in Louisiana and Oregon have asked for or might yet seek new 
trials. 215   Beyond that, however, Ramos is not only bound to bring 
collateral but potentially overreaching, long-term ramifications.  The 
Court’s treatment of stare decisis is disturbing for that reason.  On one 
hand, Justice Gorsuch has devised a means for circumventing the 
precedential status of oddly split decisions that otherwise might have 
 
 212 As mentioned above, the absence of the requirement in the final text was part of 
the basis for the plurality’s conclusion.  Id. at 410.  Justice Barrett voting in Justice 
Ginsburg’s place would not have changed the outcome of Ramos.  Nonetheless, Justice 
Barrett’s presence could have made a difference by swaying some of the Justices who 
sided with the majority.  After all, the Court is most likely to overturn existing precedent 
when new Justices have joined.  Barrett, Precedent, supra	note 108, at 1729, 1734-35. 
 213 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 6 
(Free Press) (1990).  
 214 Another potential consequence is that Ramos has put the Marks Rule in limbo.  See	
generally Sixth	Amendment, supra	note 117.  
 215 Matt Reynolds, Oregon	and	Louisiana	Grapple	With	Past	Criminal	Convictions	Made	
With	 Split	 Verdicts, ABA JOURNAL (Oct. 1, 2020), 
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/after-ramos-decision-oregon-and-
louisiana-grapple-with-split-verdicts.  The scope of Ramos’s impact will heavily hinge 
upon the Court’s decision in Edwards	 v.	 Vannoy, which will answer the question of 
whether it passes the Teague	test.  See	Howe, supra	note 61. 
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been protected by the Marks	 rule. 216   On the other hand, Justice 
Kavanaugh has evinced his willingness to overturn prior decisions 
provided that he deems the circumstances to be appropriate, and has 
gone as far as to offer his own framework for doing so.217 
While honorable in thought and delivery, Justice Roberts’s famous 
declaration that there are no “Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush 
judges or Clinton judges,” is frankly questionable.218  Indeed the clear 
facts surrounding the rulings of the Court in recent decades suggest 
otherwise.  As a result, further battles are undeniably set to follow in the 
Court and there is no question that the legal battlefield will closely 
reflect the split in the American political and social atmosphere.  And in 
this battle, “the norm of stare decisis itself has been weaponized,” but 
stare decisis can function properly “only if those who wield the weapon 
of stare decisis would be willing to accept the bitter with the sweet.”219 
A number of significant decisions loom on the horizon for the Court, 
and as Ramos	 itself shows, old battlefields can be easily renewed.220  
While intended to provide assurance that “bedrock principles are 
founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals,” stare 
decisis cannot account for the proclivity of the individuals holding the 
ultimate authority to wield it.221  In reality, consistency or predictability 
simply has not been found in the Court’s jurisprudence on stare 
decisis.222  Unfortunately, Ramos	suggests that this issue will be made 
even more obvious in the years to come.223  With the political and social 
 
 216 Varsava, supra	note 130, at 131. 
 217 Varsava, supra	note 130, at 131. 
	 218	 See	Addicott, supra	note 123, at 360 (arguing that different judges will interpret 
laws differently depending on which president appointed them).  
 219 Schauer, supra	note 93, at 140-41.  
 220 Most notably, the Supreme Court will rule on the latest challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act in California	 v.	 Texas	 (Docket 19-840), 
determine whether the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment 
permits warrantless searches of one’s home in Caniglia	v.	Strom	(Docket 20-157), and 
decide if the Eight Amendment requires trial courts to find juveniles to be incorrigible 
to render life sentences in Jones	v.	Mississippi	(Docket 18-1259). 
 221 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986).  
 222 Schauer, supra	note 93, at 140 (“[T]here does not appear to be any who have 
demonstrated the ability to combine their accusations of ignoring stare decisis with a 
willingness to adhere to stare decisis when its effect is to reinforce or perpetuate 
decisions they believe mistaken, or to support their sometimes vehemently professed 
adherence to stare decisis with a willingness to relinquish their own proclivity to 
persistent dissent.”).  
 223 Justice Gorsuch and Justice Alito recently expressed strong disagreement with the 
Court’s refusal to review a challenge to existing precedent.  Jason Small v. Memphis 
Light, Gas & Water, 593 U.S. ____ (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
LEE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2021  11:14 PM 
2021]	 STARE DECISIS ON THIN ICE 327 
atmosphere surrounding the Court continuing to diverge in both 
extremes, the end of this turmoil is nowhere near in sight.  
As an ending note, this Article will offer two claims, both by Justice 
Alito, on the principle of stare decisis.  In Ramos, Justice Alito made a 
spirited defense of the notion, arguing that “[t]he doctrine should not be 
transformed into a tool that favors particular outcomes.”224  Yet, less 
than a year before Ramos, while writing for the majority in Janus	 v.	
AFSCME225 	to overturn Abood	 v.	Detroit	Board	 of	Education226 on the 
basis of the First Amendment, the same Justice Alito who so fiercely 
fought for the “enormous reliance” of just Oregon and Louisiana on 
Apodaca	also wrote that the reliance of over twenty states on Abood	“is 
not a compelling interest for stare	decisis.”227  To make matters even 
more interesting, Justice Breyer, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice 
Sotomayor had all disagreed, perhaps even “angrily” with Justice Alito 
and the rest of the majority.228  In Ramos, by merely switching roles, 
these Justices seemingly and eerily found themselves in The	Twilight	
Zone.229 And Justice Barrett has now arrived on set.  
 
 
	 224	 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1432 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 225 Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).  
 226 Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).  This case permitted 
labor unions to require non-members to pay union dues. 
	 227	 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1425 (Alito, J., dissenting); Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2485, n.27.  
 228 Schauer, supra	note 93, at 137 (summarizing Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion 
which criticizes Justice Alito’s majority opinion).  
 229 Specifically, the author is referring to an episode from the TV series, The Twilight 
Zone, titled “Shadow Play.”  For those who have not watched this particular episode and 
would not mind having its plot spoiled, the male protagonist is sentenced to death by a 
court but laughingly dismisses the verdict, claiming that he is merely having a recurring 
nightmare.  At the end of the episode, his claim turns out to be true, as the man once 
again finds himself in another trial after he had been executed in the previous scene, 
with the same characters now playing different roles at this subsequent trial. 
